Monday, March 13, 2006

Human Trafficking for Sexual Activity—Trial Begins

Two people who are accused of “orchestrating and running sex-trade businesses in Rockford, [Illinois,] begin[] trial today in federal court.”[1] Kenneth Lee and Young Ja Hwang are facing and charges related to the alleged operation of “massage parlors that were fronts for prostitution.”[2] Prosecutors are alleging that Mr. Lee and Ms. Hwang “recruited girls from Asia to work and possibly live at the parlors where they allegedly provided customers with sexual favors in exchange for cash.”[3] Such allegation make it confusing, then, why neither individual has been charged under any number of statutes that cover for sexual activity, which would allow prosecutors to potentially secure higher sentences; instead the indictment states that the two individuals “conspired ... to use facilities in interstate commerce with intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on and to facilitate the promotion, management, establishment and carrying on, of illegal prostitution activities.”[4]

A third defendant, Mi Ran Park, has already pleaded guilty to the same charges, and has agreed to testify against Mr. Lee and Ms. Hwang.[5] In the plea, Ms. Park said “she worked for [Ms.] Hwang in early 2003 as a prostitute at the Paradise Health Spa and would split her earnings with Hwang 50/50. [Ms.] Park said she left and then returned to the Paradise as a manager of the business in November 2003 until February 2005.”[6]

Two pre-trial motions, which were denied, bear some mentioning. The first was Ms. Hwang’s attempt to have her trial severed from that of Mr. Lee’s, and the second was Ms. Hwang’s attempt to have her nickname, “Coco,” stricken from the record because it “suggests she is a prostitute.”[7]

The first motion is based on of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure [hereinafter FRCrP], which states that “if the joinder of … defendants in an indictment, an information, or a consolidation for trial appears to prejudice a defendant … the court may … sever the defendants' trials, or provide any other relief that justice requires.[8] A court should grant a severance under Rule 14 “only if ‘there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.’ A defendant is not entitled to a separate trial simply because he might have a better chance of acquittal if tried alone. A serious risk that may warrant severance occurs, for example, when a co-defendant's exculpatory testimony is unavailable to a defendant if tried with that co-defendant, or when a defendant cannot adequately cross-examine a hearsay declarant. However, mutually antagonistic theories of defense do not per se pose a risk of unfair prejudice that requires severance. This is because many times potential prejudice to a defendant may be neutralized by a limiting instruction to the jury, thereby avoiding the need for severance.”[9]

The other motion, concerning Ms. Hwang’s name, is covered by of the Federal Rules of Evidence (hereinafter FRE). Under this rule, “evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.”[10] Of course, all relevant evidence is “’prejudicial’ in the sense that it may prejudice the party against whom it is admitted. Rule 403, however, is concerned only with ‘unfair’ prejudice. That is, the possibility that the evidence will excite the jury to make a decision on the basis of a factor unrelated to the issues properly before it.”[11]


[1] Mike Wiser, , Rockford Register Star, Mar. 13, 2006.
[2] Id.
[3] Id.
[4] Id.
[5] Id.
[6] Id.
[7] Id.
[8] FRCrP 14(a).
[9] United States v. Taylor, 293 F. Supp. 2d 884, 891 (N.D. Ind. 2003) (internal citations omitted).
[10] FRE 403.
[11] United States v. Bennafield, 387 F.3d 320, 324 (4th Cir. 2002).

posted by McNabb Associates, P.C. @ 12:14 PM