Consular Relations—Tyrone Williams
The Houston Chronicle has a compelling article today about Tyrone Williams, the Jamaican truck driver who was accused and partially convicted of trafficking in persons.[1] As Mr. Williams’s retrial is gearing up to begin on November 28, a request has been made to have all of his statements to investigators suppressed.[2] This request is based on Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations [hereinafter Convention],[3] which states that a foreigner who is in prison in the United States must be able to talk to a consular officer from his country, and that he must be notified of this right. Mr. Williams was never notified of this right under the Convention.
According to South Texas College of Law professor Geoffrey Corn, however, “the key issue related to consular notification has been whether the defendant can establish an actual negative impact from the denial of consular access. … I think this would be difficult if he were advised of his rights and had an attorney.”[4]
It is a little more complicated than that, however. For instance, in the recent Supreme Court case Medellin v. Dretke,[5] the Court initially granted certiorari to consider two questions: “first, whether a federal court is bound by the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) ruling that United States courts must reconsider petitioner Jose Medellin’s claim for relief under the … Convention … without regard to procedural default doctrines; and second, whether a federal court should give effect, as a matter of judicial comity and uniform treaty interpretation, to the ICJ’s judgment.”[6] However, after the Court granted certiorari, Mr. Medellin filed a writ of habeas corpus in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, “relying in part upon a memorandum from President George W. Bush.”[7] Because the Court felt that the state-court proceeding may provide Mr. Medellin with the relief he was seeking, they decided to “dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.”[8]
The ICJ case to which the Court refers is Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.),[9] “in which the Republic of Mexico had alleged violations of the … Convention with respect to Medellin and other Mexican nationals facing the death penalty in the United States.”[10] The ICJ determined that the Convention guaranteed individually enforceable rights, that the US had violated those rights, and that the US must “provide, by means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of the [affected] Mexican nationals” to determine whether the violations “caused actual prejudice,” without allowing procedural default rules to bar such review.[11] Shortly thereafter, President Bush issued a memorandum that stated the US would fulfill its international obligations under Avena by “having State courts give effect to the [ICJ] decision in accordance with general principles of comity in cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals address in that decision.”[12] Of course, that memo only applies to State courts; it isn’t instructive as to Federal courts.
The Court also concluded that there are a number of obstacles that need to be overcome to establish that the Convention compels the type of relief sought by Mr. Williams. The Court would not say, in Medellin, whether the Convention rose above the standard set in Reed v. Farley,[13] where the Court “recognized that a violation of federal statutory rights ranked among the ‘nonconstitutional lapses we have held not cognizable in a postconviction proceeding’ unless they meet the ‘fundamental defect’ test” found in Hill v. United States.[14]
However, in an earlier case in which certiorari was denied, Torres v. Mullin,[15] Justice Stevens explained that the Convention is the law of the land under Article VI, clause 2 of the US Constitution. “[T]he ‘Laws of the United States,’ expressly including ‘all Treaties made … under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”[16] Furthermore, he noted that any interpretation of the Convention by the ICJ is binding authority on the United States. “The United States has consented to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice over Convention-related disputes.”[17]
Now, it must be noted that both Torres and Medellin refer to defendants who had been convicted without being notified of their rights under the Convention, and they lost their ability to appeal because they hadn’t raised the issue at trial. The scenario envisioned in Mr. Williams’s case is slightly different in that he is requesting that his statements be suppressed because he had not been notified of his rights. A previous case, Breard v. Greene,[18] somewhat contemplates this scenario, because the defendant in that case confessed to a murder and then asked for his conviction and sentence to be overturned because he was not notified of his rights under the Convention.[19] The Court there stated that “although treaties are recognized by our Constitution as the supreme law of the land, that status is no less true of provisions of the Constitution itself, to which rules of procedural default apply.”[20]
However, in Torres, Breard was called “hastily crafted” by Justice Stevens, and it “did not discuss the possibility that Breard may have failed to assert the treaty claim because he knew nothing about the treaty until after the state proceedings were concluded. It surely is reasonable to presume that most foreign nationals are unaware of the provisions of the … Convention (as are, it seems many local prosecutors). That is precisely why the Convention places the notice obligation on the governmental authorities.”[21] Furthermore, Justice Stevens notes, there is “obvious tension between the holding in Breard and the purpose of Article 36 of the … Convention.”[22] Thus, he concludes, “[a]pplying the procedural default rule to Article 36 claims is not only in direct violation of the … Convention, but it is also manifestly unfair.”[23]
In other words, it isn’t entirely clear what the Supreme Court thinks of the Convention's provisions, and resolution of the matter is likely a few years away. Any case that does make it to the Supreme Court will have to mount the challenges posed in Medellin.
[1] Harvey Rice, Defense Says Driver Deprived of Rights, Houston Chronicle, Oct. 28, 2005, available here.
[2] Id.
[3] Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S. T. 77, available here.
[4] Rice, supra note 1.
[5] 125 S. Ct. 2088 (2005).
[6] Id. at 2089.
[7] Id.
[8] Id. at 2090.
[9] 2004 I. C. J. No. 128 (Judgment of Mar. 31)
[10] Medellin at 2089-90.
[11] Id. at 2090 (quoting Avena at 121-22, 153).
[12] Id. (quoting George W. Bush, Memorandum for the Attorney General (Feb. 28, 2005)).
[13] 512 U.S. 339, 349 (1994).
[14] 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1062).
[15] 540 U.S. 1035 (2003).
[16] Id. at 1036.
[17] Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, art. I, 21 U.S.T. 326.
[18] 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
[19] Id. at 373.
[20] Id. at 376.
[21] Torres at 1035-36.
[22] Id. at 1036.
[23] Id.

